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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of international R&D cooperation on 
firms’ economic performance. Our empirical analysis, based on Spanish firms’ 
participation in the Framework Programme (FP) between 1995 and 2005, has confirmed 
that: (1) cooperation within the FP has a positive impact on the technological capacity of 
firms, captured through intangible fixed assets and (2) the technological capacity of firms is 
positively related to their economic performance, measured by labour productivity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of R&D cooperation, exploring the 
relationship between cooperation, knowledge generation and economic results. Empirical 
analysis is focused on consortia supported by the R&D Framework Programme (FP) of the 
European Union and, more specifically, our sample refers to those Spanish firms 
participating during the period 1995-2005. 
Consortia shaped under the FP have been considered in the literature to be a clear example 
of international R&D cooperation, since they involve partners from different nationalities 
which invest their own resources in R&D activities in order to obtain appropriable results. 
Prior studies concluded that the FP has contributed to building and consolidating R&D 
networks within the European area (Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2006; Breschi and 
Cusmano, 2006). Nevertheless, empirical evidence about the effect of the FP on firms’ 
economic performance is scarce.   
The main obstacles that authors must face when trying to measure the impact of  
participation in the FP are two: 1) how to avoid the self-selection effect and 2) how to join 
data on participation and on economic performance for a period long enough to capture the 
long-term effect of the FP R&D projects. 
Following Barajas and Huergo (2009), our empirical approach takes into account that 
cooperation in this program is the result of two decisions. First, firms have to decide 
whether or not they engage in the consortia. Second, the agency decides to approve or to 
reject the project after the evaluation. In this second stage, we are considering a selection 
equation in order to avoid the self-selection effect that can produce bias when the 
information considered refers only to firms with accepted projects. Afterwards, we analyse 
the effect of participating in the FP on technological and economic results.  
The second obstacle has been solved by joining two complementary databases. The first 
one, provided by the CDTI (the public organism in charge of monitoring the participation 
of Spanish firms within the FP), contains much relevant information about the FP projects 
and the participants and allows us to discriminate between the decision to apply and the 
agency selection. Additionally, we use data provided by the SABI database that consists of 
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company accounts for over 1,000,000 Spanish firms. This allows us to build a control 
sample with information on economic variables. Thus, we compile homogeneous samples 
containing information about more than 50,000 firms and for a long-term period.  
In contrast to other impact studies of the FP, the features of our database allow us to carry 
out the empirical analysis from a more in-depth and precise approach. Previous literature 
on the economic impact of the FP has confirmed the positive effect on firms’ technological 
capabilities, but has not provided evidence about any significant effect on economic 
performance. Our approach, based on the work by Crepón et al. (1998), believes that 
technological capabilities have a direct effect on productivity and thus participation in the 
FP could also have an indirect effect on this performance measure. 
Moreover, our database contains information for a period long enough to capture the long-
term impact of participation in FP consortia. Thus, we consider a time lag of five years 
from the application year of each project. Other works are not able to establish the same 
time lag for all the projects or consider a short-term horizon1. Finally, previous literature 
does not take into account the existing differences among FP instruments. In order to 
guarantee the homogeneity of the sample, only Specific Targeted Research Projects 
(STREPs) and Integrated Projects are considered in the present paper. 
Following this introduction, Section 2 summarises prior literature focused on R&D 
cooperation impact and, more specifically, on the FP.  In Section 3, we present the 
database and the model used to carry out the empirical analysis contained in Section 4. 
Finally, in Section 5, we draw some conclusions from the results, also pointing out key 
policy implications.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) consider a sample of firms participating during the period 1992-1994, 
indistinctly, and analyse their economic results for the period 1995-1996. Dekker and Kleinknecht (2008) use 
information for firms supported in FP4 and FP5, but they have no information about the concrete year of 
participation. Impact is measured considering sales of new products introduced in the market during the 
period 2002-2004 for the whole sample.  
 4
2. Previous empirical evidence on the impact of R&D cooperation  
 
The origin of cooperation impact studies must be explained in the framework of the 
literature on R&D impact. Following the seminal works by Solow (1957) and other authors 
which incorporated R&D as an endogenous factor in the production function (Romer, 
1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991), many studies have tried to quantify the contribution 
of technology to the economic growth of a country, industry branch or enterprise, 
concluding that the private return of R&D investments is lower than the social one. 
Griliches (1992), Mohnen (1996) and Nadiri (1993) confirmed that, on average, the social 
rate of return is 50% to 100% higher than the private one. Griliches and Mairesse (1984), 
Jaffe (1986) and Verspragen (1995) demonstrated that those spillover effects associated 
with R&D activities are responsible for the increasing rate of returns when knowledge 
flows from one firm or institution to others. 
In the 1990s, available data on firms’ innovative activities open new research paths and 
new approaches are proposed. One of the most relevant works is the paper by Crepon et al. 
(1998). Using data from the French Innovation Survey, these authors build a model (CDM 
model) which considers that the effect of R&D on firms’ productivity is the result of the 
innovation outputs and not directly of the R&D activity. Their empirical analysis 
concludes that technological results are favoured by the R&D intensity and the innovative 
dynamic of the activity branch. Moreover, productivity is positively influenced by the 
introduction of innovations in the market when controlling by human resources’ 
qualification and physical capital.  
The basic CDM model includes variables measuring the internal effort in R&D, but does 
not take into account the effect of external spillovers. In this respect, cooperation has been 
considered by some authors a valid proxy for explaining knowledge generation associated 
with those knowledge spillovers. Cincera et al. (2003) argue that cooperation is an 
alternative for measuring voluntary access to external knowledge and also for controlling 
the involuntary outgoing spillovers. In fact, a considerable amount of empirical research 
corroborates the relationship between the propensity to cooperate and the relevance of 
spillovers for the innovation process.  
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Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) find, for the case of Belgian firms, that cooperation seems 
to be a suitable strategy for internalising spillovers within formal consortia, since those 
firms which consider incoming spillovers to be more important have a greater probability 
of cooperating. Using data from the Community Innovation Survey and based on the 
previous work, several studies have been carried out, stressing the relevance of spillovers 
as an explanatory factor for R&D cooperation (Abramovsky et al. 2009). For the case of 
Spanish firms, López (2008) confirms that the probability of cooperating is positively 
influenced by the increasing relevance of incoming spillovers (measured as publicly 
available information useful for the firms’ innovation activity) and by the higher 
effectiveness of the protection of intellectual property rights.   
Previous literature analysing the effect of cooperation on firms’ performance is 
characterised by the heterogeneity of models, due, in part, to the relative novelty of this 
research area. Most papers are focused on measuring the cooperation effect on innovation 
output and economic results. Moreover, some also explore the relationship between 
cooperation effects and the type of partner selected by the company.  
One of the first studies analysing the effect of cooperation on economic results was carried 
out by Siebert (1996). This author uses a sample of 314 US joint research ventures 
registered from 1985 to 1992 in the NCRA-JRV databases (National Cooperative Research 
Act) and confirms that the effect of R&D intensity on profit margin is higher for 
cooperating firms than for non-cooperating firms. Nevertheless, cooperation does not 
affect profit margin.    
Thanks to the improvement and international harmonisation of innovation statistics in the 
1990s (mainly throughout the CIS initiative), researchers were able to measure the impact 
of R&D cooperation on new output indicators closer to the firms’ innovative activity. This 
information source also allows for distinguishing different kinds of cooperation according 
to the type of organisation selected by the company to carry our joint R&D projects. 
Researchers introduce explanatory variables capturing the type of cooperation (related to 
the type of partner) in empirical models, and measure their impact on some innovation 
output indicators. Most of the papers find a positive relationship between cooperation with 
universities/research centers and innovation output measured by the volume of sales due to 
new products (Lööf and Heshmati, 2002; Faems et al., 2005; Lööf and Broströn, 2008).  
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Nevertheless, due to the interest in knowing the real impact of cooperation on economic 
performance, and not only on innovation results, some authors try to go beyond carrying 
out more exhaustive research. One of the most cited papers is the study by Belderbos et al. 
(2004). These authors measure the effect of different types of cooperation on Dutch firms’ 
performance, captured by two indicators: the growth of added value per employee (as an 
indicator of labour productivity) and the growth of sales per employee from new-to-the-
market products (as an indicator of “innovative sales productivity”). Available data for the 
period 1996-1998 allow them to match information on innovative activity (from the CIS) 
and financial indicators for more than 2,000 enterprises. They cannot confirm that 
cooperation with universities has an effect on labour productivity, but instead find a 
significant impact on innovative sales growth. Aschhoff and Schmidt (2008) reinforce the 
positive relationship between cooperation with universities and the new-to-the-market 
product innovation. In the same study, these authors also confirm the effect of cooperation 
in process innovation, capturing throughout this indicator the cost-reduction factor 
associated with collaborative R&D.   
Another remarkable attempt to demonstrate the economic effects of R&D cooperation is 
the paper by Cincera et al. (2003). These authors analyse the effect of international R&D 
cooperation by including not only R&D expenditure, but also R&D cooperation in a 
classical productive growth function. This latter indicator is a proxy of available external 
know-how (knowledge spillovers) and complements the internal innovation effort. 
Empirical results confirm the positive impact of R&D intensity on sales growth. However, 
only cooperation with more applied objectives (with customers, suppliers or other 
companies) has a positive impact on sales growth. 
In general, the literature confirms the existence of a positive relationship between R&D 
cooperation and innovative results, but the effect on economic performance is not so 
evident. Taking into account different types of cooperation processes, empirical evidence 
seems to corroborate that the more market-oriented the cooperation is, the higher the 
probability of finding positive economic effects (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002; 
Cincera et al., 2003; Belderbos et al., 2004).  
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The impact of cooperation taking place within the FP 
The Framework Programme (FP) is the main political instrument supporting cooperative 
R&D within the European Union. It was born in 1984 with the aim of coordinating 
dispersed R&D activities funded by the European Commission. Since then, seven editions 
of the FP have been launched, evolving towards increasing budgets, new participation 
models and wider research priorities. 
Throughout the seven editions, the operative scheme of the FP has been characterised by 
several key aspects. Roediger-Schula and Barber (2006) remark that all projects are 
promoted by self-organised consortia, shaped by different kinds of partners and located in 
different nations (usually, consortia are integrated by firms, public research centres, 
universities and users). Moreover, supported projects have a limited duration and their 
R&D activity is co-financed by grants coming from the European Commission and private 
funds coming from consortia partners. Evaluation and selection processes have been 
traditionally based on scientific excellence and relevant socio-economic aspects and 
carried out by independent experts in each technological area. 
R&D cooperation within the FP is characterised by some specific features, such as the 
participation of universities and research institutes in consortia and the relevance of pre-
competitive research. Thus, we can assume that FP projects are close to the public-private 
or institutional cooperation model. In fact, as we will show below, literature on FP impact 
remarks that the main contribution of this programme is the improvement of innovation 
capabilities and most of the empirical studies do not find a direct effect on economic 
results. 
Impact studies carried out in several European countries (the UK, Austria, Finland, 
Germany, and Ireland) have reported the same general conclusions regarding firms’ 
performance: low levels of commercialisation, significant generation of new scientific 
knowledge, significant acquisition of technical knowledge and capabilities; improved 
access to technical networks (DTI-Office of Science and Technology, 2004). In the same 
line, Georghiou et al. (1992) find that the main benefit for industry is the improvement of 
skills. Also Luukkonen (1998) observes that the promotion of ‘infrastructural’ matters 
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(such as skills and training of personnel) can be considered the primary impact of EU 
research programmes.  
The specifics of the FP regarding economic impact are reinforced by Benfratello and 
Sembenelli (2002). Matching data on 411 participants in Eureka and in the FP and balance 
sheet information from the AMADEUS database, these authors compare the effect of 
cooperation taking place in the two different programmes. They corroborate the positive 
influence of Eureka cooperation on some economic variables (labour productivity and 
price cost margins), but they cannot find any effect for the case of FP participants. Authors 
explain these results by the differences between the two programmes: Eureka is more 
market-oriented and the FP is more focused on pre-competitive projects.   
Some studies have found different effects regarding firms’ characteristics. Thus,  
Luukkonen (2000) suggests that commercial and short-term objectives are much more 
relevant for small firms, since these companies are not able to maintain a large project 
portfolio and their innovation activity is based on short return periods, allowing them to 
finance consecutive R&D projects (European Commission, 2009). For the case of the 
Swedish industry, Arnold et al. (2008) report that the FP impact largely depends on the 
activity branch. They analyse four industries and confirm that, when the objectives of the 
FP consortia are closer to the market and the participation of big companies is more 
important, like in ICT or vehicles, the economic impact is higher. On the contrary, in live 
sciences or energy, the most relevant impact of the FP is related to the increasing 
technological capabilities of SMEs.    
Similar results were obtained by Polt et al. (2008). They analyse the relationship between 
the participation in the FP and the innovative activity of enterprises using data from the 
Community Innovation Survey and a wide database on participation in FP5 and FP6. They 
remark that industrial participants are characterised by higher R&D intensity and better 
network advantages. They are more oriented to international markets and have a greater 
propensity to patent.  Compared with projects financed by other sources, FP projects are 
less market-oriented, have longer development periods, are focused on non-core 
technologies of participants and are related to basic research activities. From the 
organisation perspective, these authors find that FP projects must face a lower degree of 
flexibility and higher administrative burdens. According to this empirical evidence, the 
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authors conclude that the participation of non-entrepreneurial organisations is increasing 
and, consequently, the proportion of results that could lead directly to industrial innovation 
has declined.  
Introducing a new perspective, Dekker and Kleinknecht (2008) take into account the self-
selection of applicants and analyse whether the FP participants from the Netherlands, 
Germany and France have better performance indicators because they participate or 
because they are more innovative. They confirm the existence of the self-selection bias 
associated with participation in the FP and estimate the impact equation correcting this 
aspect. Concerning the FP impact, they consider firms participating indistinctly in FP4 and 
FP5 and analyse the effect on innovative output, measured as logs of sales of innovative 
products per employee. These authors cannot corroborate a positive effect on innovative 
results, but they find a positive influence on R&D intensity for companies with fewer than 
100 employees.  
To summarise, empirical evidence on the impact of the FP seems to indicate that the main 
contribution of this programme to the industry participants is related to the improvement of 
scientific and technological capabilities and not directly to the firms’ economic 
performance.  
 
3. Empirical model and data  
When analysing the impact of any public aid, the implicit question to answer is what the 
behaviour of a supported firm would have been if it had not received this public aid. The 
problem is that each firm can only be observed either in the status of receiving the public 
support or not; that is, we cannot directly observe the additional effect. As is well known, 
if aid was granted randomly to firms (or consortia), we could estimate the effect of public 
aid on (for instance) performance as the difference between the average one in supported 
and non-supported firms. However, the evidence shows that aid is not granted randomly. 
Therefore, to measure the effect of public aid, we need to estimate or approximate the 
counterfactual. That is, we have to take into account that the awarding decision by the 
public agency probably depends on the same firm (or consortia) characteristics that 
determine performance. The econometric literature has developed several methods in order 
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to solve these difficulties2. One of the most used alternatives, and the one that will be 
followed here, is the Heckman selection model, which involves estimating what 
determines the receipt of the aid (the “selection equation”).  
Nevertheless, the application of this method is not free of difficulties. Most of the 
empirical studies that try to explain the impact of national or international aid programmes 
have information only about financed projects, and therefore are not able to distinguish 
between the firm’s decision to apply for the aid and the agency selection among the 
proposals (see, for example, Blanes and Busom (2004), who refer to participation in R&D 
subsidy programmes). The main disadvantage of this lack of information is that the 
selectivity problem is not fully considered. 
However, in our database, we also have data about rejected applications. Taking this into 
account, we can express the probability of participation in a financed cooperative R&D 
project as the following joint probability: 
Pr(participation 1) Pr(application 1,award 1 )
Pr(award 1 application 1, ) Pr(application 1, )
x
x x
= = = = =
= = = ⋅ =  
Following a previous paper by Barajas and Huergo (2009), to estimate both probabilities, 
the empirical model includes two equations. The first describes the decision of applying for 
an FP cooperation project involving at least one Spanish firm. The second equation refers 
to the awarding by the European Commission.  
Formally, we can write our model as follows. Let Ni ,...,1=  index firms. The equation 
which describes the decision to apply for an FP cooperation project (involving at least one 
Spanish firm) takes the form:  
⎩⎨
⎧ >+==
otherwise0
0if1 111
*
1
1
iii
i
uxy
y
β
    (1) 
where *1iy  is a latent dependent variable, x1i is the set of explanatory variables, β1 is the 
vector of coefficients and u1i is the error term. The firm i applies within the FP if *1iy  is 
positive.  
                                                 
2 See a detailed discussion of the different methods in the survey by Aerts, Czarnitzki and Fier (2007). 
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Conditional on firm i applying, the agency can award or reject the proposal. Again, the 
probability of being awarded is formalised in terms of a binary model: 
⎩⎨
⎧ >+==
otherwise0
0if1 222
*
2
2
iii
i
uxy
y
β
    (2) 
where *2iy  is the latent dependent variable, β2  is the vector of coefficients, u2i is the error 
term, and x2i is the set of explanatory variables which are assumed to be strictly exogenous 
or predetermined longer in advance. The proposal in which the Spanish firm i participates 
is approved if *2iy  is positive.
3  
Assuming than the error terms of both equations can be correlated (with correlation 
coefficient equal to ρ ), we estimate the system of equations (1) and (2) as a probit model 
with sample selection by maximum likelihood (using the Heckman procedure for the 
binary response variable in Stata).  
After the joint estimation of both equations, we proceed to estimate the impact of the 
supported cooperative project in terms of output. Given that the R&D projects supported 
through the FP are generally long-term projects (the average duration of a project is around 
24 months and before starting the project, the negotiation phase with the European 
Commission could also take several months), it seems reasonable to analyse its impact 
once the project has formally finished. To do so, the measures of output that we include in 
our analysis refer to the period t+5 relative to the awarding year. 
Specifically, in the second step, we analyse how participation of the firm in an FP project 
affects the generation of new knowledge. This is approached by the proportion of 
intangible fixed assets over employment, which constitutes an indirect measure of 
innovation output, given that the knowledge generated in the R&D project will usually be 
reflected by the volume of intangibles inside the firm (especially in the case of patents and 
R&D investments). Therefore, the next equation in our model is: 
iiii expk ++= δγ '*      (3) 
                                                 
3 Notice that more than one Spanish firm can participate in the same proposal, and the same Spanish firm can 
participate in more than one proposal every year. To establish a clear correspondence between firms and 
projects, in our sample we have only included one project per firm and year.  
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, where ik  stands for a firm’s intangible fixed assets, and 
*
ip  denotes the predicted value 
for the probability of participating within the FP. We include the prediction instead of the 
dummy for observed participation to take care of the selectivity problem. ix  is a vector of 
other control variables in equation (3).  
In the last step of the model, we estimated the impact of the intangible assets, as an 
indicator of knowledge capital, on a firm’s labour productivity, as an indicator of economic 
success. Therefore, if we find that intangibles are affected by participation within the FP, 
and that these intangibles increase productivity, the economic impact of the cooperative 
project will also be supported by the evidence. As a consequence, the last equation in our 
model takes the form 
 iiii vzkg ++= 2'1 ππ      (4) 
, where ig  is labour productivity, ik  is knowledge capital (represented by intangible 
assets) and zi stands for other additional controls in equation (4). We take care of the 
endogeneity of ik  in this equation by using the predicted values from equation (3) in the 
estimation. 
 
In equations (3) and (4), dependent variables refer to period t+5 relative to the awarding 
year. As we have explained previously, the R&D projects supported by the FP are 
generally long-term, and it seems reasonable to analyse its impact once they have formally 
finished and firms have obtained economic returns.  
To summarise, in this paper we apply a structural model which has the following basic 
structure: (i) firms decide whether or not to apply for a FP cooperation project; (ii) the 
proposal is awarded or rejected by the European Commission; (iii) the innovation activities 
involved in the cooperative R&D project succeed through the generation of new 
knowledge (represented by intangibles); (iv) the addition of this new knowledge to the 
production process results in productivity growth. Since we assume a recursive model 
structure and do not allow for feedback effects, we follow a three-step estimation 
procedure. In the first step, we estimate a maximum likelihood probit model with sample 
selection (Equations (1) and (2)). In the second step, we estimate the knowledge 
production function (Equation (3)) (proxied by the stock of intangible fixed assets), using 
the predicted value of the probability of participating within the FP to take care of the 
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selectivity problem. In the last step, we estimate the productivity equation, using the 
proportion of intangible fixed assets as an indicator of knowledge generation. 
We choose this structural model because it captures the main features of the phenomenon 
we want to analyse, but is parsimonious and empirically tractable with the data we have 
available. This recursive structure is, to a certain extent, similar to the one proposed in the 
well-known CDM model (Crepon et al., 1998).  
 
3.1 Database  
 
The database used here is provided by the Centre for the Development of Industrial 
Technology (CDTI), which is the public organisation in charge of monitoring the 
participation of Spanish firms within the FP. Since FP6 went into effect, the CDTI has been 
the organisation in charge of the maintenance and management of the information related to 
Spanish participation in the FP. As a consequence, the CDTI-PM database includes 
information about all the proposals,4 eventually granted or not, in which at least one Spanish 
firm participated between 1995 and 2005. This period covers part of FP4 (1994-1998), all 
of FP5 (1999-2002) and part of FP6 (2002-2006). 
This information from the CDTI-PM database has been complemented with the SABI 
database that contains the company accounts of more than 1,000,000 Spanish firms between 
1995 and 2007. The merger of the CDTI-PM and SABI databases has been possible because 
Spanish firms are identified both in the CDTI-PM and the SABI databases through their 
company tax codes. 
From the SABI database, we have selected a control sample that takes into account the 
availability of data about the relevant variables for each firm. Given that Spanish firm size is 
smaller than the European average (European Commission, 2003), we have designed the 
sample selection considering a firm to be large when its number of workers exceeds 200, 
although the threshold in international statistics is usually set at 250. We have chosen all 
companies employing more than 200 employees. Firms employing between 10 and 200 
employees are selected by a random sampling scheme for each NACE class (two-digit) level, 
                                                 
4 To guarantee the homogeneity of the sample, only Specific Targeted Research Projects (STREPs) and 
Integrated Projects are considered.  
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and represent around 4% of the Spanish Central Companies Directory (CCD), which 
comprises all Spanish companies and their local units. This makes our control sample 
representative of the Spanish economy.5 Although we have information since 1995, the 
sample used in the empirical analysis of participation refers only to the period 1999 to 
2005, given that FP5 started in 1999 and we want to take into account experience, if any, in 
the previous programme. In addition, as we use the forward values of output measures to 
capture long-term relationships, in some estimates the number of years with complete 
information is reduced to 4.  
Since our objective is to analyse the impact of collaboration within the FP on performance 
variables, our unity of analysis is the firm. In this sense, although some firms have applied 
in more than one proposal every year, we only consider one project per firm and year. We 
have given priority to those supported projects with bigger subsidies. After that, 1,555 
observations have been eliminated, where 142 observations refer to supported projects. We 
have also excluded observations of the extreme values of employment and sales growth 
rates. Specifically, we have eliminated values in the extreme percentiles (1 and 99%).  In 
addition, we dropped negative values for productivity, tangibles and intangible fixed 
assets. Overall, the final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 56,945 observations, 
11,435 companies, and 2,536 proposals.  
The CDTI-PM database allows us to analyse specifically those factors related to agency 
selection6, while the information from the joint database is used mainly to estimate the firm’s 
decision to engage in a cooperative project, and the impact of participation on the firm’s 
output.  
 
4. Results 
In this section, we present the results of the estimation of the model depicted in Section 3. 
As Equations (1) to (4) point out, we assume a recursive model where feedback from 
performance variables to the decision of applying for a FP cooperation project is not 
                                                 
5 Coverage of the data is basically restricted to firms that have at least 10 employees (annual average), but we 
have also included 615 micro-companies (0.5% of the CCD, chosen again by means of a random sampling 
scheme), given that 219 applicants of cooperative FP projects belong to this category.  
6 Proposals are evaluated by independent experts according to some common criteria. However, such 
information is absent from our database. 
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allowed. Taking this into account, we follow a three-stage estimation procedure. In the first 
stage, a probit model with sample selection including the decision to participate in a 
cooperative R&D project within the FP and the decision of awarding by the EC are jointly 
estimated consistently by maximum likelihood. In the second stage, we estimate the 
generation of new knowledge (Equation (3)), approaching the innovation output by the 
intangible fixed asset and introducing the predicted value of the probability of participating 
within the FP as an explanatory variable. In the last stage, the productivity growth equation 
(4) is estimated by including a proxy of the new knowledge as an explanatory variable; 
specifically, we introduce the predicted value of intangible fixed assets.  
 
 
Cooperation within the FP 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the results of the Heckman probit estimation associated with the 
probability of participation within the FP. The first one exhibits the coefficients of the 
probit model for the firm’s decision to apply for an FP cooperation project (equation (1)), 
while the second one corresponds to the probability of being awarded the subsidy by the 
EC (Equation (2)). We also report marginal effects in square brackets. Notice that the 
correlation term ρ  in Table 2 is significant, pointing out the necessity of estimating a 
selection model for the awarding decision7.  
The explanatory variables included in Equations (1) and (2) follow the selection made by 
Barajas and Huergo (2009) for a quite similar sample8. The results basically confirm the 
evidence obtained in that paper. As for the applying equation, as can be seen in Table 1, 
most coefficients are statistically significant, although marginal effects are small except for 
those variables measuring the FP experience in the previous year. In general, explanatory 
variables increase the probability of applying for an FP cooperation project, with the 
exception of the liquidity ratio, which has a negative impact, which is consistent with the 
idea that cooperation can be considered a strategy for avoiding financial obstacles 
associated with R&D projects for firms with financial constraints.  
                                                 
7 The Heckman procedure for the binary response variable in STATA does not take into account the panel 
structure of the data and the information is treated as a pool. However, in Barajas and Huergo (2009), the 
decision to apply has been estimated as a random-effects probit model taking into account the panel structure 
of the data and the results are basically the same. 
8 Find the exact definitions of the variables in Appendix A. 
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Table 1: Probability of applying within the FP. Probit estimates. 
 
 Coefficient Std. E. 
Time dummies     
     Year 2000 -0.054  [-0.003] 0.038 
     Year 2001 -0.040  [-0.002] 0.037 
     Year 2002 -0.280 *** [-0.012] 0.041 
     Year 2003 0.055  [0.003] 0.036 
     Year 2004 -0.258 *** [-0.011] 0.040 
     Year 2005 -0.233 *** [-0.010] 0.041 
Prior experience in FP proposals 0.564 *** [0.047] 0.029 
Granted project in previous year 1.545 *** [0.289] 0.045 
Rejected proposal in previous year 1.650 *** [0.315] 0.030 
Exporter 0.125 *** [0.006] 0.023 
Liquidity ratio -0.048 ** [-0.002] 0.020 
Intangible fixed assets over employment 0.033 *** [0.002] 0.008 
EBITDA margin 0.232 *** [0.012] 0.087 
Stock market 0.322 *** [0.023] 0.067 
Firm’s size dummies (no. of workers)     
     From 10 to 49 -0.239 *** [-0.011] 0.041 
     From 50 to 99 -0.351 *** [-0.014] 0.044 
     From 100 to 199 -0.395 *** [-0.016] 0.045 
     More than 200 -0.385 *** [-0.018] 0.040 
Region     
     Basque Country 0.300 *** [0.020] 0.037 
     Catalonia 0.113 *** [0.006] 0.030 
     Madrid 0.119 *** [0.006] 0.030 
     Valencia 0.112 *** [0.006] 0.042 
 High-tech services     
     Post and telecommunications 0.603 *** [0.055] 0.068 
     Computer and related activities 0.459 *** [0.036] 0.039 
     Research and development 0.583 *** [0.053] 0.072 
 High and medium-tech manufacturing     
     Chemicals and chemical products 0.020  [0.001] 0.049 
     Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.020  [0.001] 0.051 
     Office machinery and computers 0.495 *** [0.041] 0.144 
     Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.052  [0.003] 0.076 
     Radio, television and communication  0.257 *** [0.017] 0.076 
     Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.156  [0.009] 0.096 
     Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.072  [0.004] 0.073 
     Other transport equipment 0.432 *** [0.034] 0.079 
Log of likelihood function -8,190.55 
Number of observations 56,945 
 
Marginal effects in square brackets. Std. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 
10%*. All regressions include the constant. Dummies excluded for firms with fewer than 10 employees and the year 
1999. Marginal effects are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to the 
change from 0 to 1.  
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Table 2: Probability of being awarded. Probit estimates. 
 
 Coefficient Std. E. 
Year of the application    
     Year 2000 0.064  [0.007] 0.114 
     Year 2001 0.241 ** [0.029] 0.109 
     Year 2002 0.149  [0.017] 0.126 
     Year 2003 -0.251  [-0.023] 0.219 
     Year 2004 0.001  [0.000] 0.217 
     Year 2005 0.016  [0.002] 0.200 
Participation of organisms -0.470 *** [-0.050] 0.168 
Size (of consortium) 0.707 *** [0.075] 0.071 
FP budget for the specific programme -0.009  [-0.001] 0.018 
Leader nationality    
    British -0.032  [-0.003] 0.122 
    Dutch 0.345 * [0.048] 0.188 
    French 0.220 * [0.028] 0.127 
    German 0.361 *** [0.051] 0.113 
    Italian -0.104  [-0.010] 0.130 
    Spanish 0.312 *** [0.042] 0.087 
Technological area    
    Aeronautic and aerospace 0.259  [0.034] 0.246 
    Agro-food 0.261  [0.034] 0.269 
    Environment and energy 0.024  [0.003] 0.230 
    ICT 0.129  [0.015] 0.217 
    Innovation programmes 0.385  [0.055] 0.335 
    New materials 0.247  [0.032] 0.195 
    Transports 0.311 ** [0.042] 0.130 
Geographical distance -1.079 *** [-0.114] 0.107 
Prior experience in granted FP projects 0.143 * [0.017] 0.080 
Granted project in previous year -0.031  [-0.003] 0.109 
Rho     0.089 *  0.046 
Log of likelihood function -8,190.55 
Number of censored / uncensored obs. 54,409 / 2,536 
 
Marginal effects in square brackets. Std. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 
5%**, 10%*. All regressions include the constant. Dummy excluded for the year 1999. Marginal effects are 
computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to the change from 0 to 1.  
 
 
When we analyse the coefficients of the time variables, we observe that firms applied in 
smaller proportion in 2002, 2004 and 2005. The first one corresponds to the last year of the 
edition of the FP4 and confirms that firms tend to submit a smaller percentage of proposals 
when the current programme edition is finishing, probably due to the lower number of calls 
for proposals. The other two dummy variables correspond to the FP6 and allow us to 
compare both FP5 and FP6. The results are consistent with the fact that, in comparison 
with FP5, FP6 was less favourable to the technological objectives of Spanish firms, which 
consequently applied in smaller proportions.  
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As expected, previous experience in FP proposals increases the probability of applying in 
future editions and especially when the prior experience took place during the previous 
year. Since the application process within the FP is very costly, companies in consortia that 
have been rejected will try to profit from the accumulated knowledge, applying to the 
following calls. The probability of engaging in an FP project increases about 30 points for 
firms with experience in the last year, while it increases almost five points for firms with 
experience in previous editions of the FP.  
With respect to the rest of the explanatory variables, exporters, firms that are on the stock 
market, and companies that present a higher ratio between intangible fixed assets and 
employment, are also more likely to apply. The earnings in terms of sales (approached by 
EBITDA), as a measure of ex-ante firm market power, also present a positive effect. This 
result is coherent with the Schumpeterian hypothesis that the less competitive the markets 
are, the more incentives for firms to innovate (and to participate in R&D consortia) since 
they are better able to capture innovation benefits. However, this empirical evidence could 
also be supporting the existence of an informal competitive process among proponents in 
order to take part in those FP consortia led by the most reputed organisation. Thus, the 
most profitable firms have a higher probability of being selected by consortia coordinators. 
The coefficients of the set of size dummies indicate a negative impact of size on the 
probability of applying. This unexpected result can be affected by the fact that our control 
sample is biased towards large firms, which are chosen on the basis of a census, while 
firms employing between 10 and 200 employees are selected by a random sampling scheme. 
Additional work would be necessary to study this result more closely9.  
With respect to the geographical indicators, firms located in the Basque Country, 
Catalonia, Madrid and Valencia show higher probabilities of submitting an application, 
which is consistent with the major concentration of technological firms in these regions. 
The last rows of Table 1 present the coefficients of industry dummies10. Firms that carry 
                                                 
9 Barajas and Huergo (2009) present complementary estimations for two sub-samples: small and medium 
size enterprises (SME), and large firms. They found a non-linear effect of size which is negative for the SME 
and positive for large firms. 
10 We also include some other industry dummies with statistically significant effects. Specifically, Education, 
Clothing apparel and footwear and Other business activities, which include architectural and engineering 
activities and related technical consultancy, should be noted. An opposite case is the Hotels and restaurants 
industry, with a lower probability of participating in technological projects. In reference to the Energy sector, 
both FP4 and FP5 had specific programmes for the development of sustainable energies, which increased the 
occasions for firms to present proposals. The results are available from the authors upon request.  
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out high-tech activities are also more prone to become proponents. The probability of 
engaging in an FP project increases more than 5 points for companies in the Post and 
telecommunications service sector and R&D sector. Also, affiliation to Computer and 
related activities, Office machinery and computers, and the transport equipment industry 
increases the probability of applying by about 4 points.  
Table 2 shows the coefficients corresponding to the estimation of the equation for the 
probability of being awarded aid by the EC. Again, the results confirm the evidence 
provided by Barajas and Huergo (2009). Firstly, the presence of public organisations 
within a consortium and the distance among the partners negatively affect the viability of 
the proposal. Both variables can be reflecting the existence of coordination costs. With 
respect to the participation of non-entrepreneurial organisations, these costs could be 
associated with the differences in private and public cooperation routines, especially 
concerning the protection of innovation results.  
Secondly, the inclusion of a new member in the consortium increases the probability of 
being supported by 7.5 points. In this case, the required technological diversity of the 
research equipment seems to exceed the coordination cost associated with each additional 
partner. 
Thirdly, the probability of being supported increases when the project belongs to the 
Transport area11, and especially when the proposal is led by a German organisation., 
Spanish firms that participate in consortia led by companies or organisations from 
Germany – a very active country within the FP- probably earn greater experience, enjoy 
better coordination routines, and therefore are more likely to receive aid from the EC.  
Previous experience in FP projects has less impact on the probability of being supported 
than on the probability of applying. It seems clear that “learning-by-doing” is a more 
relevant factor in explaining the decision to participate due to the complexity of the FP 
procedures and the need to exploit scope economies once the effort to apply is made and 
the consortium is shaped. 
                                                 
11 Most of the total budget of the FPs is allocated to information and communication technologies. Therefore, 
it seems that the EU gives priority to these technological areas. Our result that only firms which carry out FP 
programmes in Transport show a greater probability of receiving aid can be a consequence of the criteria 
followed to eliminate the firms which have more than one project. Most of the dropped observations are 
projects belonging to ICT, Transport and Aeronautical technologies areas.   
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Finally, although the temporal dummies which indicate the year in which the firm applied 
are jointly significant, they do not present significant coefficients in any year. That is, 
according to these results, there are no specific differences in the probability of being 
supported in both FP5 and FP6.  
 
Impact on knowledge accumulation 
 
We next proceed to estimate Equation (3). As already stated, to capture the impact of 
supported cooperative projects, our measure of technological output is the proportion of 
intangible fixed assets over employment. We assume that this constitutes an indirect 
measure of innovation output, given that the knowledge generated in the R&D project will 
usually be reflected by the volume of intangibles inside the firm, especially if the new 
knowledge is protected through patents12. In Table 3, we describe the variables used in the 
following econometric analysis.  
The firms’ technological capabilities are represented by their intangible fixed assets, given 
the intangible character of R&D13. The difference of means test confirms that the average 
of this variable in the sample is higher for participants within the FP than for non-
participants. The proportion of intangibles over employment is slightly lower for 
participants. On the contrary, the percentage of tangible fixed assets per employee is higher 
for supported firms. Participants seem to be more productive, although the difference is 
small. 
In addition, we consider a set of geographical dummies to be explanatory variables, as the 
more technological Spanish firms tend to locate in specific regions. As we can see, for 
participants, the percentage of companies located in Madrid, Catalonia and the Basque 
Country (regions with R&D intensities above the national average), is higher than for non-
participants.  
We also take into account whether the firm’s activity corresponds to a high-tech service 
sector or a high or medium-tech manufacturing sector according to the OCDE 
                                                 
12 Most previous empirical evidence approaches the new knowledge by other technological outputs as 
product and process innovations, or sales generated by new products. However, this information is not 
available in our database.  
13 Spanish accounting rules allow for the capitalisation of R&D expenditures under certain conditions 
(mainly when there are reasonable expectations of marketable results).   
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classification. The frequencies in Table 3 reflect a high presence of these activities among 
participants, especially in high-tech services.  
 
 
Table 3: Features of the participants. Descriptive statistics 
 
Means of quantitative variables: Total sample Participants Non-participants 
Intangible Fixed Assets (€) 3,120.05 7,362.01 3,091.83 
Intangible Fixed Assets over Employment (€) 13.93 11.91 13.94 
Tangible Fixed Assets (€) 22,272.04 108,593.5 21,697.33 
Tangible Fixed Assets over Employment (€) 76.49 127.38 76.15 
Productivity (sales over employment) (€) 247.17 268.77 247.02 
Firm size (nº of  employees) 355.41 877.41 351.93 
Frequencies of binary variables: Total sample Participants Non-participants 
Stock market 1.25 6.87 1.21 
Exporter 49.81 66.76 49.70 
Basque Country 7.51 15.93 7.45 
Catalonia 24.62 27.20 24.61 
Madrid 23.56 32.42 23.50 
Valencia 9.67 6.87 9.69 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 17.07 25.55 17.01 
High-tech services 5.88 15.66 5.82 
 
 
A firm’s export activity is captured through a binary variable that takes the value one if the 
firm is an exporter during the period. As we can see in Table 3, the percentage of exporters 
among participants is 16 points higher than among non-applicants.  
As an additional control variable, we include a dichotomy variable that reflects whether the 
firm is listed on the stock market. This kind of company is usually financially more 
consolidated and international funds could be less attractive to it. However, firms on the 
stock market tend to show more formalised quality procedures and therefore could have 
more systematic collaboration routines. In our sample, stock market companies are more 
frequent among participants. 
The empirical results are reported in Table 4. We assume that all explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous and the estimation is carried out by OLS using a random effect model 
for panel data.  We have included some control variables in the specification like time, 
size, export activity, industries (to capture some sector-specific effects as technological 
opportunities) and regional (to control for the concentration effect in some Spanish areas) 
dummies. 
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The coefficients reported in this table are semi-elasticities because the dependent variable 
is measured in logarithms. Specifically, as all explanatory variables are dummies, they 
show the variation rate in unitary terms of intangible fixed assets per employee when the 
explanatory variable changes from 0 to 1.   
Due to the pre-competitive orientation of FP projects, we assume that their results will 
have effects in the long term. In this sense, our dependent variable refers to the period t+5, 
where t is the awarding year14.  
 
Table 4: Intangible fixed assets per employee (t+5)   
 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Std. E. Coefficient Std. E. 
FP participant (observed) 0.083  0.061    
FP participant (predicted)   0.394 ** 0.172 
Stock market 1.174 *** 0.182 1.169 *** 0.181 
Exporter 0.156 *** 0.030 0.154 *** 0.030 
Firm size dummies (nº. of workers)      
  From 10 to 49 -0.104 ** 0.048 -0.104 ** 0.048 
  From 50 to 99 -0.201 *** 0.052 -0.201 *** 0.052 
  From 100 to 199 -0.279 *** 0.053 -0.280 *** 0.053 
  More than 200 -0.358 *** 0.053 -0.358 *** 0.053 
Region      
  Basque Country 0.057  0.058 0.052  0.058 
  Catalonia 0.246 *** 0.039 0.245 *** 0.039 
  Madrid 0.117 *** 0.039 0.116 *** 0.039 
  Valencia 0.030  0.049 0.029  0.049 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 0.073 *** 0.041 0.072 * 0.041 
High-tech services 0.318 *** 0.070 0.314 *** 0.070 
Sigma of u 1.210 1.209 
Rho 0.868 0.867 
Number of observations 23,089 23,089 
 
Std. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include 
the constant and temporal dummies. Dummy excluded for firms with fewer than 10 workers. 
 
 
 
We are interested in comparing the effect of predicted participation versus observed 
participation. In Table 4, the first column corresponds to the model in which we included 
the dummy for observed participation (yes /no) as an explanatory variable, while in column 
(2), this variable is substituted by the prediction obtained in the previous step (estimations 
of Equations (1) and (2)). It should be remarked that taking the selection problem into 
                                                 
14 Most empirical evidence also recognises the need to measure effects using a long-term perspective (see 
Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002; Dekker et al., 2008).  
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account is relevant: whereas the coefficient for observed participation is not significant, the 
predicted probability of participation positively affects our technological output. 
Specifically, being a firm that cooperates in an FP increases the ratio of intangible fixed 
active over employment almost 40%. This result is in concordance with those presented by 
Dekker et al (2008).  
With respect to the control variables, industry dummies are highly significant. Firms 
belonging to high-tech manufacturing and services and medium-tech manufacturing have a 
higher potential of generating technological outputs.  The level of intangible fixed assets 
per employee increases 7% in manufacturing and more than 31% in services. As expected, 
we find regional differences in terms of technological output. Firms located in Madrid and 
Catalonia present a bigger level of intangible assets.  
We obtain a negative effect of the size dummies. Most previous empirical evidence for 
Spanish manufacturing provides a positive relationship between firm size and the 
probability of being engaged in technological activities and obtaining product or process 
innovations, stressing the capacity of large firms to exploit economies of scale. However, a 
negative relationship is found in terms of innovation intensity: large firms present a lower 
proportion of resources in R&D with respect to smaller firms.  
Finally, being a company listed on the stock market or being an exporter also positively 
affects the generation of new knowledge. Specifically, firms operating in international 
markets register an increment of 15% in the ratio of intangible fixed assets over 
employment.  
 
Impact on labour productivity  
 
The variable used to analyse the impact of cooperation on economic performance is labour 
productivity, measured as the ratio between total sales and number of employees. 
Estimations of the productivity equation (4) are shown in Table 5. Again, the estimation is 
carried out by OLS using a random effect model for panel data.    
The coefficients reported in Table 5 are elasticities or semi-elasticities, since the dependent 
variable is the logarithms of sales per employee. In addition to control variables referring 
to size, industry, year, and firm location, we have included a proxy of physical capital 
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intensity in the model, measured throughout the variable “tangible fixed asset per 
employee”. Finally, to capture the effect of knowledge accumulation on productivity, we 
have included the predicted value of “intangible fixed assets over employment” from 
Equation (3).  
By means of these estimations, we analyse whether participation within the FP has not 
only an indirect effect but also a direct effect on firms’ economic success. As we have 
demonstrated in the previous section, the predicted probability of being awarded aid 
enhances the ratio of intangible fixed assets. If we find a positive relationship between this 
proxy of technological output and the level of productivity, the indirect economic impact 
of cooperation on productivity would be confirmed. If we find that FP participation also 
has a significant effect on productivity, an additional direct effect of cooperation on 
economic performance would be corroborated.   
In the first column of Table 5, we present the obtained results, considering neither the 
observed nor the predicted participation to be explanatory variables. Under these 
conditions, the impact of the predicted value of “intangible fixed assets per employee” on 
productivity is clearly significant, reflecting a difference in favor of innovative firms. 
Specifically, if the ratio of intangible assets duplicates, it causes productivity to grow more 
than 12% (see Table 5). As firms participating in FP present higher technological outputs, 
this result supports an indirect effect of cooperation on this performance variable.  
In columns (2) and (3), the specification also includes the dummy for observed and 
predicted participation, respectively. As can be seen, both of them are not significant. 
Therefore, it seems that cooperation in FP does not have a direct effect on performance 
variables. This result is in concordance with those presented by Benfratello and Sembenelli 
(2002). Using a different methodology, they do not find significant differences in the 
labour productivity of firms that have participated in FP 3 and FP 4. In a similar way, 
Dekker et al (2008) confirm that innovative output – sales of innovative product per 
employee- is not enhanced by participation in the EU FP in France, Germany and The 
Netherlands.   
Additionally, there are no changes in the coefficients of the rest of variables. Capital- 
intensive firms – approached by the ratio “tangible fixed assets per employee” – are also 
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more productive. As in previous empirical evidence, exporting firms are also more 
efficient than non-exporting firms.  
 
Table 5: Labour productivity (t+5) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Std. E. Coefficient Std. E. Coefficient Std. E. 
FP participant (observed)   0.010  0.032    
FP participant (predicted)     0.044  0.070 
Intangible Fixed Assets per employee 
(predicted) (t+5) 
0.121 *** 0.009 0.120 *** 0.012 0.120 *** 0.012 
Tangible Fixed Assets per employee (t+5) 0.336 *** 0.005 0.336 *** 0.014 0.336 *** 0.014 
Stock market -0.110  0.089 -0.111  0.168 -0.111  0.168 
Exporter 0.381 *** 0.022 0.381 *** 0.025 0.381 *** 0.025 
Firm size dummies (nº of workers)        
  From 10 to 49 0.079 *** 0.024 0.079 ** 0.036 0.079 ** 0.036 
  From 50 to 99 0.097 *** 0.027 0.097 ** 0.038 0.097 ** 0.038 
  From 100 to 199 0.122 *** 0.028 0.122 *** 0.039 0.122 *** 0.039 
  More than 200 0.130 *** 0.028 0.130 *** 0.039 0.130 *** 0.039 
Region        
  Basque Country 0.176 *** 0.042 0.176 *** 0.039 0.175 *** 0.039 
  Catalonia 0.195 *** 0.028 0.195 *** 0.030 0.195 *** 0.030 
  Madrid 0.344 *** 0.028 0.344 *** 0.031 0.344 *** 0.031 
  Valencia 0.016  0.037 0.016  0.040 0.016  0.040 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 0.152 *** 0.029 0.152 *** 0.028 0.152 *** 0.028 
High-tech services -0.094 ** 0.047 -0.094 ** 0.046 -0.094 ** 0.046 
Sigma of u 0.889 0.889 0.889 
Rho 0.894 0.894 0.894 
Number of observations 22,985 22,985 22,985 
Std. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include 
the constant and temporal dummies. Dummy excluded for firms with less than 10 workers. 
 
 
With respect to the size dummies, we find a positive linear relationship between firm size 
and productivity.  We also obtain geographical differences in terms of productivity. Firms 
located in Catalonia, the Basque Country and Madrid show a higher productivity than the 
rest of the firms. As expected, firms from high-tech and medium-tech manufacturing 
industries present larger levels of productivity. However, the opposite happens with firms 
in high-tech services. 
 
Finally, as a robustness check we estimate the model using the growth rate of labour 
productivity as a dependent variable in Equation (4)15. In this case, intangible fixed assets 
per employee are also included in growth rates in Equation (3). The results confirm the 
                                                 
15 See the results of the estimates for Equations (3) and (4) in Tables B.1 and B.2 of Appendix B.  
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positive impact of cooperation within the FP on the technological capacity of firms and the 
indirect effect of participating in the FP on labour productivity through intangible fixed 
assets. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of R&D cooperation on economic 
performance. Empirical analysis is focused on consortia supported by the R&D Framework 
Programme (FP) of the European Union and, more specifically, on Spanish firms 
participating during the period 1995-2005. 
In general, literature confirms the existence of a positive relationship between R&D 
cooperation and innovative results, but the effect on economic performance is not so 
evident. Taking into account different types of cooperation processes, empirical evidence 
seems to corroborate that the more market-oriented the cooperation, the higher the 
probability of finding positive economic effects (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002; 
Cincera et al., 2003; Belderbos et al., 2004).  
Previous empirical analyses agree about the positive effect of the cooperation carried out 
within the FP on variables related to technological capabilities (Georghiou et al., 1992; 
Luukkonen, 1998; Arnold et al., 2008; Polt et al., 2008; Dekker and Kleinknecht, 2008), 
but evidence about the effect on economic performance is scarce. Considering the specific 
features of the FP (ambitious projects; consortia shaped by different types of organisations 
located in different countries; long-term periods; pre-competitive orientation in most of the 
cases), it is obvious that the economic effect of this kind of project should be analysed 
from a different perspective.  
In this respect, one of the main contributions of the present paper is the application of a 
recursive model structure to capture the relationship between cooperation, knowledge 
generation and economic results. The model has the following basic structure: (i) firms 
decide whether or not to apply for a FP cooperation project; (ii) the proposal is awarded or 
rejected by the European Commission; (iii) the innovation activities involved in the 
cooperative R&D project succeed through the generation of new knowledge (represented 
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by intangibles); (iv) the addition of this new knowledge to the production process causes 
productivity growth.  
With respect to participation within the FP, the results confirm the evidence obtained in a 
previous paper by Barajas and Huergo (2009) about the determinants of applying in the FP 
and being awarded aid by the European Commission. Moreover, we have corroborated that 
the self-selection bias exists and, thus, we have estimated the impact equation by 
alternatively using the predicted and the observed probability. Going one step further, we 
have confirmed that the predicted probability of participating in the FP has a positive 
impact on firms’ technological capabilities. Specifically, five years after the project is 
awarded aid, the ratio of intangible fixed assets over employment increases almost 40%. 
The variable used to analyse the impact of cooperation on economic performance is labour 
productivity, measured as the ratio between sales and employment. The impact of the 
predicted value of “intangible fixed assets over employment” on productivity is clearly 
significant. Specifically, if the ratio of “intangible fixed assets over employment” 
duplicates, it causes productivity to grow more than 12% five years after awarding aid to 
the project. This result supports an indirect effect of participating in the FP on firms’ 
performance, captured throughout labour productivity.  
From the aforementioned evidence, we can draw some conclusions regarding the interest 
of policy makers. The key idea supported by the study is the existence of a positive 
relationship between participation in FP consortia and firms’ economic performance. 
Nevertheless, this effect is not as direct as in other public programmes, such as Eureka 
(Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002). In this respect, it is necessary to take into account that 
the evaluation criteria followed in the FP refers to scientific and technological excellence, 
coordination abilities of the consortium, European added value (in terms of critical mass of 
resources mobilised and contribution to Community policies) and potential for 
disseminating the knowledge and achieving innovations 16. Therefore, results must be 
assessed according to these criteria. 
                                                 
16 Rules for Participation in the Sixth FP (Regulation (EC) No 2321/2002, Article 10). These criteria are quite 
similar to the ones of  FP5. 
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Obviously, the ideal situation is to attain all those objectives, but the fact is that the market 
is not always the immediate recipient of research results, especially if we are talking about 
border research. Thus, the direct impact of the FP seems to be related to the improvement 
in innovative capabilities that, to a large extent, are intangible assets, which are difficult to 
measure. Considering intangible assets introduced in accounting, our work has 
demonstrated that participation in the FP has a positive impact. The issue from the point of 
view of policy makers is how to capture the impact in the rest of the intangible assets, 
following objective and efficient criteria. Nowadays, surveys and interviews seem to be the 
best option in order to complement the analysis of financial information, since accounting 
systems are only valid instruments for evaluating some intangible assets, such as 
capitalised R&D expenditure, patents and software.   
The second conclusion is that the economic impact of the FP should be evaluated from a 
long-term perspective once the specific project is finished and the market dynamic has 
allowed firms to introduce innovations. Otherwise, impact assessments could being 
ignoring a relevant contribution on firms’ performance. 
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Appendix A: Definition of variables 
EBITDA margin Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization divided by sales. 
Exporter Company exports during the period. 
Firm size Firm’s number of employees in the current year (<10, 10-49, 50-99, 100-199, 200+) 
FP budget for the specific programme Percentage of the total FP budget allocated to each specific programme. 
Geographical distance Percentage of partners from Northern Europe, Eastern Europe and non-European 
countries in the total number of partners. The percentage is multiplied by 2 or 3 if the 
partners are, respectively, from 2 or 3 of the aforementioned geographical areas. 
Granted project in the previous year At least one of the Spanish firms involved in the consortium participated in a granted 
project the previous year. 
High-tech services Company belongs to the high-tech services (NACE2 codes 64, 72, 73).  
High and medium-tech manufacturing Company belongs to any high or medium-tech manufacturing sectors (NACE2 codes 
24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35).  
Intangible fixed assets per employee Ratio between intangible fixed assets and total employment in the current year (in 
logs.) 
Labour productivity Sales per employee (in logs.) 
Leader nationality The leader of the consortium is (British, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Spanish). 
Liquidity ratio Shareholders’ funds in non-current liabilities in the current year 
Participation of organisations Ratio between the number of non-entrepreneurial organisations and the total number of 
consortium members in the proposal. 
Prior experience in FP proposals The Spanish firm applied to the FP in the edition previous to the current one. 
Prior experience in FP granted projects At least one of the Spanish firms involved in the consortium participated in a 
cooperative project financed during the FP edition previous to the current one. 
Region Firm is located in (the Basque Country, Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia).  
Rejected proposal in the previous year At least one of the Spanish firms involved in the consortium participated in a rejected 
project during the previous year.  
Size of the consortium Total number of members (firms, public organisations or other institutions) in the 
consortium (in logs). 
Stock market Company is listed on the stock market.  
Tangible fixed assets per employee Ratio between tangible fixed assets and total employment in the current year (in logs.) 
Technological area Project is related to (ICT, new materials, environment and energy, transport, agro-food, 
aeronautic and aerospace, innovation programmes).  
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Appendix B: Complementary estimates 
 
 
Table B.1: Growth of intangible fixed assets per employee (t+5)   
 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient Std. E. Coefficient Std. E. 
FP participant (observed) 0.094  0.065    
FP participant (predicted)    0.355 ** 0.158 
Stock market 0.037  0.042 0.034  0.042 
Exporter -0.011  0.008 -0.012  0.008 
Firm size dummies (nº. of workers)       
  From 10 to 49 0.040  0.028 0.041  0.028 
  From 50 to 99 0.034  0.028 0.035  0.028 
  From 100 to 199 0.022  0.027 0.022  0.027 
  More than 200 0.023  0.027 0.023  0.027 
Region       
  Basque Country -0.038 ** 0.016 -0.041 ** 0.016 
  Catalonia -0.034 *** 0.010 -0.034 *** 0.010 
  Madrid -0.038 *** 0.010 -0.039 *** 0.010 
  Valencia 0.007  0.013 0.007  0.013 
High and medium-tech manufacturing -0.003  0.010 -0.004  0.010 
High-tech services -0.033 * 0.017 -0.036 ** 0.018 
Sigma of u 0.027 0.029 
Rho 0.002 0.003 
Number of observations 22,277 22,277 
 
Std. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include 
the constant and temporal dummies. Dummy excluded for firms with fewer than 10 workers. 
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Table B.2: Labour productivity growth (t+5) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Std. E. Coefficient Std. E. Coefficient Std. E. 
FP participant (observed)   -0.006  0.037    
FP participant (predicted)     -0.015  0.080 
Growth of intangible fixed assets per 
employee, predicted (t+5) 0.375 *** 0.113 0.381 *** 0.116 0.389 *** 0.144 
Growth of tangible fixed assets per 
employee (t+5) 0.446 *** 0.026 0.446 *** 0.026 0.446 *** 0.026 
Stock market -0.081  0.056 -0.081  0.056 -0.081  0.056 
Exporter 0.003  0.007 0.003  0.007 0.003  0.007 
Firm size dummies (nº of workers)          
  From 10 to 49 0.025  0.030 0.025  0.030 0.025  0.030 
  From 50 to 99 0.024  0.030 0.023  0.030 0.023  0.030 
  From 100 to 199 0.044  0.029 0.043  0.029 0.043  0.029 
  More than 200 0.036  0.029 0.035  0.029 0.035  0.029 
Region          
  Basque Country 0.044 *** 0.014 0.045 *** 0.014 0.045 *** 0.015 
  Catalonia 0.017 * 0.009 0.017 * 0.009 0.017 * 0.010 
  Madrid 0.039 *** 0.010 0.039 *** 0.010 0.040 *** 0.011 
  Valencia 0.008  0.013 0.008  0.013 0.007  0.013 
High and medium-tech manufacturing 0.014 * 0.008 0.014 * 0.008 0.014 * 0.008 
High-tech services 0.038 ** 0.016 0.039 ** 0.016 0.039 ** 0.016 
Sigma of u 0.177 0.177 0.177 
Rho 0.168 0.168 0.168 
Number of observations 22,137 22,137 22,137 
 
Std. E.: Estimated standard error. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All regressions include 
the constant. Dummy excluded for firms with fewer than 10 workers. 
 
 
 
 
